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Abstract∗
EC Consumer Protection Law and EC Competition Law are amongst the most important
areas of law, having a deep regulatory impact on the functioning of markets. Their
alignment, in terms of goals and approach to the regulation of markets, seems in principle
very substantial: both share the benefit of consumers as their most relevant purpose and
organizing principle.
However, when one looks deeper into the underlying economic issues that both areas of
the Law are more apt at addressing, significant differences become apparent. Monopoly
power is the crucial problem for Competition Law in general, and EC Competition Law is
no exception to this. Consumer Protection Law however, is not – and should not be -
concerned with market power as such, not even in its version of inequality of economic or
bargaining power between producer and consumer. The relevant economic phenomenon
that justifies in economic terms consumer protection legislation, both at National and
European levels, is imperfect information in consumer markets. The focus on informational
failures explains the kind of instruments and approaches most common in EC Consumer
Law. The divergence in economic rationales, however, is not incompatible with the idea
that, in certain circumstances, joint consideration both of competition issues and consumer
protection factors appears necessary, but should not lead us to forget the main role of each
branch of the Law.
Summary
1. Introduction
2. The essential alignment in goals of consumer protection and competition Law
3. The different underlying economic problems in consumer protection and competition
Law
4. The substantial irrelevance of monopoly power –and inequality of bargaining power- for
consumer protection Law
5. Consumer protection Law as a set of instruments to reduce information imperfections in
consumer markets
6. The weighing of competitive gains in consumer protection Law
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1. Introduction
Consumer Protection Law and Competition Law count as some of the major branches of
the Law dealing with the legal regulation of markets. Their relationship in terms of goals,
main issues and structures has not been extensively considered, however, especially in
what concerns their role in EC policy and Law. In this paper I will try to offer an analysis of
this relationship from the perspective of Law and Economics. Even though neither of them
can be understood and operated irrespective of each other, I will attempt to underline how
the apparent similarities substantially disappear when one looks at the substantive market
imperfections that each of them faces. The emphasis I will place on informational failures
as the major rationale for legal activism in consumer markets is fully consistent with the
findings of several recent commentators, with a more or less explicit economic propensity
in their approach1. I will also stress what I take to be important lessons for the design and
operative functioning of EC Consumer Law.
In section 2, I will deal with the common goal in consumer protection Law and competition
Law of promoting the benefit of consumers. In section 3, I present what I deem to be the
key factor for a deeper understanding of the proper role of both legal areas: the economic
problem that each of them is apt to address adequately.  In section 4, I discuss why
consumer protection Law is not an efficient instrument for dealing with of issues of
monopoly and related practices, and how a focus on market power would be misleading
and, ultimately, counterproductive for the operation of EC consumer Law. In section 5, I
propose a more restricted but, I think, more effective type of approach to consumer
protection Law, that permits an increased understanding of its economic strengths and
weaknesses. In section 6, I provide a brief and simple example of circumstances in which
joint consideration of competition and consumer protection issues seems advisable, and I
also conclude.
2. The essential alignment in goals of consumer protection and competition
Law
At first glance, of all possible pairings of sectors or areas within a legal system, only a few
can claim to be as well aligned in terms of goals and underlying foundations and structural
components as consumer protection Law and competition Law. Both areas of the Law, as I
                                                
1 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Robert Howse, and Michael J. Trebilcock, “Information-Based Principles for
Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy”, 21 Journal of Consumer Policy (1998), p. 131; Stefan Grundmann,
Wolfgang Kerber, and Stephen Weatherill, “Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal
Market – an Overview”, in Stefan Grundmann, Wolfgang Kerber, and Stephen Weatherill (Eds.), Party
Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin-New York (2001), p. 7;
Stefan Grundmann, “Verbraucherrecht, Unternehmensrecht, Privatrecht – warum sind sich UN-Kaufrecht
und EU-Kaufrechts-Richtllinie so ähnlich?”, 202 AcP (2002), p. 40, specially p. 61.
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will attempt to demonstrate in this section, seem to share, in a fundamental way, a core
purpose behind their corresponding legal rules, doctrines, and enforcement mechanisms2.
To say that the goal of consumer protection Law is to promote the benefit and the interests
of consumers is almost tautological. It is true, however, that what constitutes the benefit of
consumers is not something that everyone would agree upon, and that it can be
understood in different forms and with various emphasis: as economic efficiency and social
welfare in consumers’ markets, as a re-distributive policy objective favoring consumers, or
even as a paternalistic view of what the legal and economic rights of the consumer
population should look like3. Probably, the reasons behind all real-world consumer
protection legislation in all real-world legal systems combine to a greater or lesser extent,
welfare, redistribution, and paternalist threads4, rightly or wrongly understood, and EC
consumer protection Law is no exception to this. Additionally, the qualifying element of
building an effective internal market also for all consumers’ goods and services looms large
in EC consumer policy and Law. This feature comes as no surprise, given the nature and
constraints (particularly the legal constraints posed by articles 153 and 95 EC Treaty)
concerning the role of the EC in this field and its law-making powers. But this emphasis on
the cross-border and harmonization dimension does not undermine the central purpose of
the legislative effort as being one directed to the promotion of the benefit of consumers.
The purpose of competition Law is evidently to preserve and enhance the competitive
structure of markets for goods and services. As simple economic theory shows, the big
winners from competitive market structures are precisely the consumers of the goods and
                                                
2 Of course, for those who believe in the coherence and purpose of a legal system, all areas of the Law
share a common goal, be it justice, equality, happiness, efficiency, wealth maximization, social welfare, or
other imaginable goal. Even though I do think that the whole theoretical and human machinery of the
legal system is not a blind enterprise, and that there is a fundamental common purpose in it – albeit
instrumental and not self-defined -, what I am referring to in my claim, is narrower than the fundamental
ends of the legal system: it is the presence of a more specific and operational affinity in goals, that is not to
be found in other areas of the Law – say, Tort Law, or Intellectual Property Law - despite the possible
overall encompassing existence of a common goal in the legal system. For an excellent review of fairness
or justice-based and human welfare-based conceptions of the goal of a legal system (with a strong bias and
forceful arguments in favor of the latter), see Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), (2002).
3 For instance, in the Commission’s new consumer policy strategy for the period 2002-2006, adopted on 7
May 2002, the bold statement that “…all consumers (across the EU) should benefit from the same high level of
protection…”, in line with the provisions of articles 95.3 and 153.1 of the EC Treaty, could (although not
necessarily “should”) be interpreted as an open admission of the fact that achieving a homogeneous high
amount of consumer protection is a proper and valuable goal in itself, no matter how much or how
diversely different consumers might value the level of protection, and how willing they would be to pay
for it. In other terms, that a high level of consumer protection is a “merit good” (one which the political
power has decided should be consumed by citizens in a certain amount, no matter how the real demand
for it may be) that helps and benefits consumers even if they themselves do not recognize it. I am not
implying by this that EC consumer policy has to be understood largely as a paternalistic policy, just that
some of its formulations are not inconsistent with this view, and that some amount of it is an ingredient of
EC policy.
4 See Ian Ramsay, “Consumer protection”, in Peter Newman (editor), The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics and the Law, vol. I, MacMillan, London, (1998), p. 410, emphasizing the combined presence of
those three rationales, and expressing overall a positive opinion on this plurality of motivations. For
reasons that will become clear in section 5 below, I am somewhat skeptical about the appeal of the re-
distributive and paternalistic motives in consumer protection Law.
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services. Perfect competition ensures that all consumers who value a certain good or
service at more than what it would cost  for the society to produce the good or provide the
service, will obtain it at the price which reflects the exact social cost.  Allocative and
productive efficiency are simultaneously achieved. Moreover, the surplus generated by the
production and provision of goods through the competitive market accrue entirely to
consumers, so their position cannot be improved by Government policy or legal rules.
As is widely understood among economists, lawyers and policy-makers, though, the
attempt to replicate the conditions for perfect competition5 in all markets for goods and
services is doomed to failure and it can even be counterproductive. The desire to bring all
markets as close as possible to these ideal conditions with the use of legal rules and policies
will be futile in many cases, because of unavoidable constraints to the number of
producers, level of information, entry costs, and so on. Moreover, it may be overtly
inefficient and, therefore, harmful to consumers under several circumstances: when there
are increasing returns to scale, a small number of producing firms, even just one firm,
might be required for productive efficiency, that is, for producing the good or service at the
lowest available cost for society; when informational goods are involved, the need for an
incentive to produce the good in the first place may require the award of a temporary
monopoly in the distribution of the product6.
So, more realistically, the proper economic role of competition Law, and of competition
policy more generally, is to avoid the negative efficiency consequences of those market
structures that most openly depart, without good reason, from competition, notably those
arising from the presence of a single producer or a group of producers acting like a single
                                                
5 The standard assumptions in economic theory for a perfectly competitive market are the following:
atomicity of producers (the number of producers is so large that no single producer has an impact on what
others do); product homogeneity (the products by all different producers are perfect substitutes); perfect
information (both producers and consumers have perfect knowledge of all relevant variables); equality of
producers (all producers have the same technology and cost functions); free and unlimited entry (any
producer may enter or exit the market as it wishes). Of course, this set of assumptions clearly shows that
perfect competition is a theoretical construct, and that it is not something that we can derive by induction
or observation from real-world markets. Still, it is an extremely useful benchmark to evaluate the
performance and the possible corrective measures in real life markets.
6 The use of patents and copyrights as exclusive rights on the production and distribution of a given
informational good (invention, work of literature or art, computer program, etc.) conferring some
monopoly power on the right-holder is explained in economic terms by the need to provide dynamic
incentives for the creation of informational goods: if these were sold from the start under conditions of
perfect competition, and given that the marginal cost of providing an additional access to the
informational good (an additional viewer of the film, an additional user of the computer program, for
instance) is close to zero, the expected profit for the original producer of the good also approaches zero, so
the inventor or creator will not be able to recover the fixed costs of creating the invention or work in the
first place. To provide incentives to overcome this problem, the legal system grants temporary exclusive
rights, leading to market structures departing, in some cases widely, from the conditions of perfect
competition. Needless to say, these exclusive rights pose problems of their own, even some that are of
great interest to competition Law (under-dissemination of existing works, abuse of patent and copyright,
monopoly leverage). These disadvantages are the reasons used by some to advocate, on economic
grounds, the use of other alternatives to provide incentives for the production of new intellectual goods:
See Tanguy van Ypersele and Steven Shavell, “Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights”, 44 Journal of
Law and Economics (2001), p. 525.  Nevertheless, the economic case for making an exception, at least to
some extent, to the conditions of perfect competition in order to induce a more desirable level of
production of informational goods, has firm grounds in economic theory.
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producer, that is, monopoly and collusive behavior.  Still, this relatively more restricted
scope of competition Law does not alter the fact that consumers remain the beneficiaries of
curtailing monopoly and collusive behavior of firms.
When a monopolist, or a group of firms behaving like one, restricts output to maximize
profit, it causes a raise in price above the competitive level. This will bring about a shift in
the ultimate beneficiary of the surplus of the market exchange. A fraction of this surplus
(even the whole surplus, under certain conditions) will be transferred from consumers to
producers, making the former worse-off and the latter better-off. More importantly in
economic terms, the restriction in output will determine that some consumers who value
the good or service above the social cost of its provision – but less than the monopoly price-
will be deprived of the possibility of its purchase, and will be forced either to do without it,
or else to turn to less-preferred -or more costly to produce in social terms- alternative
goods. This is the most characteristic economic deadweight loss caused by monopoly and
collusion7. Its elimination or weakening by competition Law serves primarily the interest of
consumers, and benefits them, in very much the same way as consumer protection Law,
albeit perhaps in a more indirect and less easily observable manner.  Competition Law,
however, might pursue, by means of legal rules against monopolistic and collusive
behavior, other goals different from the elimination of the efficiency losses that monopoly
creates to the detriment of consumers. Some of these alternative goals might also be
inspired by the intention to directly benefit consumers (redistribution of market surplus or
income, more generally, in favor of consumers) or might be largely independent of
consumers’ welfare (the promotion and advance of small and medium-sized enterprises
instead of large firms8, the desire to block the leverage and concentration of the political
power of economic interests and groups). I am highly doubtful about the aptitude of any
competition Law system to achieve these other “non-economic goals”, but the likelihood of
its past, present, or future adoption as goals by a given legal system cannot be entirely
disregarded, although it is uncertain whether some of these purposes do play a role in the
operation of EC competition Law.
                                                                                                                                              
7 Other economic inefficiencies have been claimed as arising out of monopoly. One is the wasteful rent-
seeking that will be encouraged by the desire to acquire or to maintain the monopoly rents, rent-seeking
process that in the extreme would eat up all supra-competitive profits, transforming the shift in
consumers’ to producers surplus in a net loss. This claim is associated particularly with the Chicago Law
and Economics School, most notably, with Richard Posner, “The Social Costs of Monopoly and
Regulation”, 83 Journal of Political Economy (1978), p. 807. There is also relatively widespread sharing of the
idea that monopolistic market structures might be less friendly to innovation and to the development and
introduction of new technologies. Although there is sound theoretical support for this claim, at least since
Arrow’s classic article [Kenneth Arrow, “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Inventions”, in Ralph Nelson (editor), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University
Press, Princeton (NJ), (1962)], it is not unlikely that other strategic factors might counteract the
disadvantage of monopolistic firms in terms of the pure incentives to innovate, so that the actual relevance
of this inefficiency remains unclear: Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, Cambridge
(MA), (1988), p. 392 and following. Less well-grounded still is the claim that monopoly would lead
necessarily to a decrease in the quality of goods and services offered to consumers: Neither in economic
theory nor in empirical evidence is there sufficiently strong support for this view. See Oz Shy, Industrial
Organization. Theory and Applications, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA), (1995), p. 315 and following, and infra,
p. 7-8.
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3. The different underlying economic problems in consumer protection and
competition Law
From this community of goals and intended beneficiaries, it would be easy to jump to the
conclusion that the fundamental economic questions involved, and the adequate theoretical
approach are also the same in both branches of the Law. I will try to show that this view is
misleading, and, moreover, that it can prove notably harmful for a proper design and
understanding of consumer protection generally, and at the EC level more specifically.
Despite the fact that promoting consumers’ welfare can be justly considered the governing
purpose of both competition Law and consumer protection Law, the divergence between
the economic problems that both sets of legal rules are supposed to address is very
substantial. I will argue that consumer protection Law is apt –and, consequently, should be
used primarily for this purpose - at redressing the inefficiencies in consumer markets
arising from a family of market failures, namely imperfect information, and particularly, at
least for the more “contractual” portion of consumer protection Law, asymmetric
information between producers and consumers. Competition Law, in turn, is – and should
be-, as argued in the previous section, primarily concerned about the inefficiencies derived
from monopolistic market structures and related issues (collusive and exclusionary
practices)9. Using consumer protection Law to deal with issues of monopoly power to the
detriment of consumers is not only futile in most instances, but will lead us astray in the
appropriate design and implementation of consumer protection Law, and can result in
unintended harmful consequences for consumers’ welfare.
Let me first illustrate the idea that the negative consequences for consumers of
monopolistic structures and practices are typically those that competition Law is precisely
supposed to tackle.
As is well known, and was briefly examined in the previous section, when there is only one
producing firm (or several firms acting as a cartel) output is restricted and the price of the
good or service increases to the detriment of consumers’ and society’s well-being10. But no
matter how large the market power or the monopoly power of the firm, it usually has no
incentive to engage in other types of contractual behavior that are unfair or detrimental to
consumers’ welfare11. If consumers can observe the relevant variable of the transaction
(quality of the good, fairness and adequacy of the rights and obligations from the contract,
                                                                                                                                              
8 A motivation that might not be totally absent from Directive 2000/35/EC, of 29 June 2000 on combating
late payment in commercial transactions.
9 As Gillian K. Hadfield, Robert Howse, and Michael J. Trebilcock, “Information-Based Principles for
Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy”, 21 Journal of Consumer Policy (1998), p. 150 very aptly state it:
Antitrust policy focuses on the structure of markets, and consumer protection policy focuses on the
structure of consumer transactions.
10 One should keep in mind the qualifications mentioned in text corresponding to note 6 above.
11 This proposition is true under conditions of perfect information. With imperfect information it does not
necessarily hold, and for a monopolistic firm (a competitive firm too, as we will see) market incentives
might fail in ways that prove harmful for consumers, but the real issue is, then, the informational problem,
and not the monopolistic structure of the market.
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accuracy of advertising statements, and so forth) the monopolist will generally have the
appropriate incentives to offer the level of quality in the relevant variable that consumers
desire12. If the firm offered a level of quality, say in the rights and obligations in case of
breach of contract, lower than the one that consumers would prefer, this would mean that
the value of increased quality to consumers would exceed the cost to the firm of providing
the additional quality to reach the level preferred by consumers. By definition, the
monopolist would not be maximizing profit in this situation, because the firm could raise
quality to the consumers’ desired level, and raise the contract price an amount that more
than compensates the firm for the increased costs of providing the additional quality.
Cheating consumers in quality to save production costs will only result in a lower
consumer willingness to buy the good or service, and thus, would lead to lower prices and
lower profits for the monopolist.
4. The substantial irrelevance of monopoly power –and inequality of
bargaining power- for consumer protection Law
In the ordinary understanding of consumer protection legislation, particularly with respect
to the contractual sphere, inequality of bargaining power between firms and consumers
appears to be one of the bigger, if not the biggest, source of concern and failure in the
contracting process, requiring the corrective intervention of legal measures directed to
redress the imbalance in contractual power13. This is, for instance, the view of the ECJ who,
in regard of the Directive in Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts stated that “…the system
of protection introduced by the Directive is based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position
vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as regards both the bargaining power and his level of knowledge.”14 It
is also the one expressed by many legal commentators on contractual consumer protection
Law15. According to the economic substance of the interaction under perfect information,
                                                
12 In more technical terms, this conclusion that the monopolist will offer the socially optimal level of
quality in all observable contract variables holds only for a homogeneous population of consumers. When
consumers differ in their valuations and preferences for quality (some would be willing to pay a high price
for fair contractual rights and obligations, but others largely disregard this aspect), the monopolistic firm
would care for the quality preferences of the marginal consumer, and if these are lower or higher than the
ones of inframarginal consumers, quality would be too low or too high: A. Michael Spence, “Monopoly,
Quality and Regulation”, 6 Bell Journal of Economics (1975), p. 417. A presentation of these results in a more
lawyer-friendly way, in Richard Craswell, “Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and
Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships”, 43 Stanford Law Review (1991), p. 361.
13The idea that the exercise of economic power over consumers is the major traditional rationale behind
consumer protection policy is also present in Gillian K. Hadfield, Robert Howse, and Michael J. Trebilcock,
“Information-Based Principles for Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy”, 21 Journal of Consumer Policy
(1998), p. 133; Pamaria Rekaiti and Roger van den Bergh, “Cooling-Off Periods in the Consumer Laws of
the EC Member States: A Comparative Law and Economics Aproach”, 23 Journal of Consumer Policy (2000),
p. 371, at p. 373.
14 Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98 ECJ, Océano Grupo Editorial SA v. Rocío Murciano Quintero and
others.
15 See Hugh Beale, “Inequality of Bargaining Power”, 6 Oxford J. Legal Stud. (1986), p. 123; Manfred Wolf,
“Party Autonomy and Information in the Unfair Contract Term Directive”, in Stefan Grundmann,
Wolfgang Kerber, and Stephen Weatherill (Eds.), Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal
Market, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin-New York (2001), p. 313, at p. 323; Remiert Tjittes, in Beale, Hartkamp,
Kötz, Tallon (editors), Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland
(OR), (2002), p. 527. Stefan Grundmann, “Verbraucherrecht, Unternehmensrecht, Privatrecht – warum sind
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though, this view is largely unfounded, as it equates the issue of quantity restriction (which
is, justifiably, associated with monopoly) with that of reduction in quality of the relevant
transaction variables, including contractual rights and obligations. The fact that we have a
large monopolistic firm contracting with a minuscule (in economic terms) consumer, does
not by itself raise concerns and suspicions about the terms of the transaction that consumer
protection Law is well-placed to address and eventually to improve upon. Improvements,
if such is the case, might come from the side of competition Law, but these will affect price
paid and quantity transacted by all consumers, and not the terms of the individual
contract.
It is true, though, that there are instances in which a link between monopoly and imperfect
information can be traced. Firms enjoying monopoly power might have incentives to
exploit, or even create, imperfections in the information available to consumers, especially
with the goal of price discriminating between groups of consumers differing in their ability
to obtain or process the relevant information16. This and other related problems do not call
for consumer protective measures specifically addressed to monopoly power issues. They
can be more fruitfully understood and tackled within the overall setting of the provision of
information to consumers in the market, in which the efficiency condition of equality
between marginal social benefits and marginal social costs of providing information to
consumers are very rarely met, and this regardless of the competitive or monopolistic
structure of the underlying product or service market (although inefficiencies arise for
different reasons).
There are also circumstances in which an existing imperfection in the available information
might induce a monopolistic firm to alter the preferred level of quality in the contract in
order to maximize profits. It is not consumers’ ignorance about a relevant variable of the
transaction that drives this result, but rather the producer’s lack of information.
If consumers differ in their valuation of the good or service, the monopolist would
maximize profits by sorting them into groups according to their willingness to pay and
charging them a different price (price discrimination). If the monopolist could readily
observe the type of a given consumer, no changes will be required in the most efficient
level of quality of the contract terms. But if the monopolist ignores the type of a given
consumer, and if willingness to pay is correlated with some dimension or element in the
                                                                                                                                              
sich UN-Kaufrecht und EU-Kaufrechts-Richtllinie so ähnlich?”, 202 AcP (2002), p. 40, at p. 65 is more
dubious about the strength of the belief of European lawyers in the inequality of bargaining power theory.
To be fair to lawyers, it must be said that faith in that theory was shared by most economists before the
development of the economics of information. Moreover, apart from the issues discussed in this same
section, it is true that private information is not unrelated to bargaining power in a bargaining situation or
game. Indeed, private information is a big source of bargaining power. Private information, however, is
far from being perfectly correlated with size or economic dimension (firm vis-à-vis consumer) and, in fact,
in many transactions between consumers (used houses or second-hand vehicles) it is indeed pervasive.
16 Steven Salop, “The Noisy Monopolist: Imperfect Information, Price Dispersion and Price
Discrimination”, 44 Review of Economic Studies (1977), p. 393;  Howard Beales, Richard Craswell, and
Steven Salop, “The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information”, 24 Journal of Law and Economics (1981),
p. 507.
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contract terms (say, a term contemplating liquidated damages for breach of the contract),
the producer will be inclined to introduce17 a menu of contracts to divide consumers into
groups corresponding to their willingness to pay for the good or service: for instance, one
contract will include a high damage term together with high price, and the other would
include an inefficiently low damage term (the inefficiency is introduced on purpose to
prevent high-valuation consumers from choosing the cheap contract) together with a low
price18.
One could think that, if we were able to identify the existence of monopoly power in a
setting of heterogeneous consumers and monopolist ignorance of consumers’ types,
consumer protection legislation should enter the picture imposing a minimum level of
quality in the contractual terms, so no inefficient terms are introduced in the contracts
offered by the monopolist with the purpose of price discriminating among different types
of consumers. The problem with this call to consumer protection Law to redress monopoly
evils, is that the impact of its rule in this setting is largely indeterminate and, eventually,
might act to the detriment of consumers, for three reasons. Firstly, because if not all
relevant terms that might be used by the producer for screening purposes are covered by
the minimum standards imposed by consumer legislation, we would simply get a shift in
the distortions towards those terms not regulated under the consumer protective
measures19. Second, because it is hard for legislators, regulators or Courts to collect and
elaborate all the information required to reasonably determine the optimum floor for all
relevant contract terms. Finally, and more importantly, because the legal imposition of
levels of quality and contract terms for consumer transactions involving a monopolistic
seller might induce not a better serving of all types of consumers but simply a price rise
that would leave those groups with a lower willingness to pay excluded from getting
access to the product or service20.
                                                
17 In technical terms, the fact that the initiative is on the side of the uninformed party (the producer, in this
case), makes the interaction one of screening and not of signaling.  See on this, Eric Rasmusen, Games and
Information. An Introduction to Game Theory, 3rd edition, Blackwell, Oxford, (2001).
18 This is a well-established result of the economic theory of imperfect information: See Inés Macho-Stadler
and David Pérez-Castrillo, An Introduction to the Economics of Information. Incentives and Contracts, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, (1997), p…. For applications in the Law of contract damages and default terms of
contract Law, see Jason Scott Johnston, “Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default
Rules”, 100 Yale Law Journal (1990); Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, “Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules”, 99 Yale Law ournal (1989), p. 87; Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner,
“Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules”, 101 Yale Law Journal (1992), p.
729. A recent survey of all this literature, in Fernando Gómez, Previsión del daño, incumplimiento e
indemnización, Civitas, Madrid, (2002).
19 Alan Schwartz, “An Examination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability”, 63 Virginia Law Review (1977),
p. 1053.
20 In more technical economic terms, that the legal regulation of terms might not only lead from the
original and less efficient separating equilibrium (separating because each consumer type gets a different
thing, in this case, each signs a contract with different terms, some of which, as we have seen, are
inefficient) to a more efficient pooling equilibrium (pooling because there is no discrimination and all
consumers get the same contract terms). The imposed terms might imply that the profit-maximizing
strategy for the monopolist is one leading to a separating equilibrium, but one in which separation occurs
because price is so high that only consumers with high willingness to pay get the good or service and the
rest do not buy. On this result,  see Fernando Gómez, Previsión del daño, incumplimiento e indemnización,
Civitas, Madrid, (2002).
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In summary, there does not seem to be any good reasons to engage the machinery of
consumer protection Law to directly combat the negative effects of monopoly and
monopolistic practices. This should be primarily left to competition Law, or other relevant
branches of the Law, such as public regulation of the market21. Consumer protection
legislation has a comparative advantage, however, in addressing (some of) the deficiencies
in the operation of consumer markets arising from a broad and complex range of market
failures that can be loosely grouped together under the heading of imperfect information.
5. Consumer protection Law as a set of instruments to reduce information
imperfections in consumer markets
In this section I will argue that the economic understanding of imperfections in the
information available in consumer market transactions offers the best guide for the
definition, scope, boundaries, and instruments, but also the inherent limitations of
consumer protection Law. Other alternative principles do not allow for the theoretical
coherence and the empirical testability that imperfect information brings to this area of the
Law, and, moreover, they result ultimately in a lower level of consumers’ preferences,
satisfaction and social welfare than the economic understanding makes possible. I will not
deal extensively with these alternatives, but, once the monopoly power rationale has been
discarded, I will say a few words about redistributive and paternalistic motivations in
consumer Law.
Distributional concerns are of great importance for social welfare and, thus, a legitimate
concern of the legal system as a whole. But there are, I think, convincing reasons that allow
us to think that a strong redistributional concern in favor of consumers and away from
firms has no good claims to a proper place in a well-functioning consumer Law. The
argument is twofold.  First, the redistributional concern will largely be moot due to
changes in contract prices: given that typically consumers and producers are in a
contractual relationship, the attempt to redistribute through substantive rules favoring
consumers will be to a large extent defeated by adjustments in price and other terms that
will offset the intended redistribution22.
                                                
21 In the same sense, in addition to authors cited in note 1 above, Christian Kirchner, “Justifying Limits to
Party Autonomy in the Internal Market – Mainly Consumer Protection”, in Stefan Grundmann, Wolfgang
Kerber, and Stephen Weatherill (Eds.), Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market,
Walter de Gruyter, Berlin-New York (2001), p. 165, at p. 168.
22 See Richard Craswell, “Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller
Relationships”, 43 Stanford Law Review (1991), p. 361;  David Weisbach, “Taxes and Torts in the
Redistribution of Income”, University of Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Program in Law & Economics,
Working Paper No. 148 (2002). Not everyone agrees on this, of course: Ian Ramsay, “Consumer
protection”, in Peter Newman (editor), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol. I,
MacMillan, London, (1998), p. 413.
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Second, even when the redistributive effort is not counteracted by contractual
rearrangements, substantive legal rules are a more haphazard and less effective way to
achieve this end than the tax and public transfers system23.
The case for paternalism in consumer protection Law is, at first glance, and somewhat
paradoxically, not as unconvincing in economic terms as the one favoring redistribution.
Consumer protection Law, and the legal system more generally, can influence individuals’
preferences and, thus, can change them in a way that is in the long-term interest of the
individuals affected by the preference change. For instance, by imposing a certain level of
consumers’ information, rights, and protections, EC consumer Law could instill in
European consumers a new preference for extended rights and, say, healthier consuming
environments that might positively affect the well-being of those consumers in the long
run, even if most of them did not have the preference in the beginning and were not willing
to pay a price for the rights and protections afforded by the legal rules. From an economic
standpoint this paternalistic legal intervention would be viewed favorably, as long as, as
we had assumed for the sake of the argument, it increases social welfare. This is, of course,
a purely theoretical possibility. Quite a different matter is how likely it is that the
paternalistic motivation behind legislators, regulators and Courts in the field of consumer
protection will actually be converted into consumers’ welfare-enhancing policies and rules.
In this respect, the affirmative is much more uncertain.
 I am doubtful whether redistributive and paternalistic motivations can be traced in EC
consumer protection Law.  The grouping together in art. 95.3 EC Treaty of consumers’ and
workers’ rights might be a hint towards the former motivation, and some wording in
Directives’ preambles and Community programs can also be interpreted as a hint towards
the latter. In any case, from an economic perspective none of them provide a sound basis
for EC consumer Law.
Imperfect information, on the contrary, constitutes a type of market failure able to provide
a reasonable starting point for organizing our knowledge about the optimal role and likely
effects of consumer protection legislation. Of course, we should not think that consumers’
markets are the only markets in which informational imperfections are likely to loom large.
Corporate Law, insurance Law and even general contract Law are areas in which economic
                                                
23 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, “ Why the Legal System is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income”, 23 Journal of Legal Studies (1994), p. 667; Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, “
Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income”, 29 Journal of Legal Studies (2000), p. 821. The core of the argument is as follows: the
use of taxes and transfers as redistribitutional mechanisms just creates a distorsion, namely in the work-
leisure trade-off. Substantive legal rules generate a double distortion: one, the same we have just described
for taxes, the other, the inefficiency generated by a legal rule chosen not on its efficiency merits, but on its
redistributional effectiveness. Again, some disagree with this gloomy view of legal rules as redistributive
instruments: Christine Jolls, “Behavioral Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules”, in Cass Sunstein (editor),
Behavioral Law and Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (2000), p. 288. Su Economics,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (2000), p. 288; Chris William Sanchirico, “ Taxes versus Legal
Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View”, 29 J. Legal Stud. (2000), p. 797
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models of imperfect information play a crucial role in understanding legal institutions and
rules and predicting their relative performance in real-world markets.
On the other hand, we should not think that consumer markets are entirely dominated by
imperfect information. Even if we abstract from legal constraints and requirements to this
effect, the level of information provided by and at the disposal of market participants in
consumers’ markets is by no means negligible24.
Consumers acquire information about relevant characteristics and variables affecting the
transactions on goods and services by several means. In some cases, by direct
observation25. In others, by learning through repeat purchase and consumption26. They can
also get information about relevant aspects from third parties, be they people known to
them, or independent private and public sources.
Producers themselves are major providers of information in consumers’ markets. Through
labels, product descriptions, and contract information firms communicate significant
amounts of information to consumers on goods and services. Of course, advertising plays a
key role in transmitting information on the existence, characteristics, prices and other
determinants of market transactions. And not only so-called “informative” advertising has
this positive informational role. Even advertising apparently devoid of any significant
informational content (like celebrity endorsement of a product, say), is able to convey to
consumers valuable signals about the level of quality or other important features of the
transaction: advertising, and the reputation that is usually associated with it, are extremely
powerful market mechanisms to effectively signal consistent levels of quality to consumers,
particularly in markets for experience goods27.
More surprisingly, market forces can, under some conditions, induce producers to disclose
even unfavorable information to consumers or, more generally, to the other party in a
prospective transaction. In what is one of the more striking results of the economics of
information, it can be shown that, when the private information in possession of the seller
is verifiable (that is, ex post it can be determined if disclosure of information was truthful),
and the consumer knows that the seller has private information (though not its content, or
else it would not be private information of the seller), the seller will voluntarily reveal the
information even if it is unfavorable (for instance, that the quality of her product is below
                                                
24 A recent review of instruments increasing information available to consumers in Thomas Wein,
“Consumer Information Problems – Causes and Consequences”,  in Stefan Grundmann, Wolfgang Kerber,
and Stephen Weatherill (Eds.), Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market, Walter de
Gruyter, Berlin-New York (2001), p. 80.
25 In these cases, economists speak of search goods or search characteristics, given that search can make
consumers informed about them.
26 In these cases, economists speak of experience goods or characteristics, because consumers will become
informed after consuming the good. When even after consumption the relevant variables are not
ascertainable by the consumer, economists speak of credence goods.
27 On this warranty function of advertising, see Fernando Gomez, “ The European Directive on Consumer
Sales: An Economic Perspective”, in Stefan Grundmann and C. Massimo Bianca (editors), EU Sales
Directive Commentary, Hart Publishing Company, Oxford and Portland (OR), (2002) (forthcoming), and
literature cited therein.
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average). This unraveling result stems from the fact that, given the two assumptions just
mentioned, consumers expects from all silent sellers the worst possible news concerning
the content of the private information. Sellers whose private information is best would
voluntarily disclose it, and so would set in motion a continuous process of revelation by the
decreasingly good-news sellers, until only that with the worst private information (say, the
worst quality) is left alone without disclosure. And consumers would actually observe that
their expectations are met: only the worst private information remains undisclosed, and the
rest is voluntarily revealed28.
But even if the amount of information provided to consumers through market mechanisms
is considerable, it is undeniable that in many circumstances and for many transactions in
consumer markets the level of information is far from perfect, and that there is room for
improvement in this lack of information through legal rules apt at the correction of
informational market failures.
These informational market failures arise out of a broad range of factors: First, some market
participants might engage in fraudulent and deceptive practices, inducing inaccurate
representations in consumers that cause distortions in their decisions and behavior. Maybe
due to the uncontroversial characterization of fraud, misrepresentation and deception as
undesirable phenomena, the fact is that the role of consumer protection Law in deterring
such inefficient market practices has not been fully appreciated. Probably the unscrupulous
fly-by-night producer is the major source of consumers’ misinformation and overall harm,
and the efforts to deter this type of seller are among the most valuable in the whole
enterprise of consumer protection policy29. This explains and justifies the existence of rules
against misleading advertising30, as well as strict information and contract formation
                                                                                                                                              
28 The unravelling result was developed by Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, “Disclosure Laws and
Takeover Bids”, 35 Journal of Finance (1980), p. 323; Paul Milgrom, “Good News and Bad News:
Representation Theorems and Applications”, 12 Bell Journal of Economics (1981), p. 380; and Sanford
Grossman, “The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure of Product Quality”, 24 Journal of
Law and Economics (1981), p. 461. A less technical presentation with applications to various fields of the
Law, in Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner and Randall Picker, Game Theory and the Law, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge (MA), (1994), p. 89 and following; Robert Gertner, “Disclosure and unravelling”, in Peter
Newman (editor), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol. I, MacMillan, London, (1998),
p. 605. Empirical studies have found clear evidence of voluntary disclosure and unravelling. For instance,
Alan Mathios, “The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices: An Analysis of the Salad
Dressing Market”, 43 Journal of Law and Economics (2000), p. 658-660, shows how the unobservable
information (fat content) concerning  salad dressings is subject (albeit not completely) to the unraveling
effect, by which almost all of the low-fat producers voluntarily disclose the fat content whereas the high-
fat ones remain silent.
29 By the way, here we can observe some discrepancy between the conditions and outcomes of competitive
market and those of adequate consumer protection: Rogue sellers are more likely to be operating in a
market when there are low –or virtually none- barriers to entry, when there are many sellers, and when
the rate of entry and exit in the market from the producer’s side is high. All these conditions are typical
features of a competitive market structure. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Robert Howse, and Michael J.
Trebilcock, “Information-Based Principles for Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy”, 21 Journal of
Consumer Policy (1998), p. 153, p. 155.
30 Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 on misleading advertisement, and Directive 97/55/EC of 6
October 1997, concerning misleading advertising so as to include comparative advertising. Needless to
say, this does not make the determination of when an ad is deceptive or misleading an easy task. Issues
such as context, implied claims, heterogeneity of consumers, and existence of more informative
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requirements in those consumers’ markets and contractual practices more likely to have a
high proportion of small and quickly exiting firms, such as door-to-door sales, distance
sales, and electronic sales31.
Consumers’ lack of information can be the result of well documented phenomena32 in
consumers’ behavior such as bounded rationality (limited capacity to acquire and process
information)33, over optimism, use of cognitive heuristics (hindsight bias, excessive reliance
on easily available data, excessive representativeness of small samples, too little weight of
future and uncertain events, etc), and rational ignorance (if acquiring information is –even
minimally- costly for the consumer, but having the information would not change neither
the terms of the transaction nor future use, the consumer may rationally forgo the
acquisition of information and prefer to remain ignorant on a relevant variable)34.
Consumers’ ignorance due to all these factors is hard to ameliorate. Firms do have some
incentive to educate and inform consumers so that those problems are less acute in many
cases. But the market incentives for firms do not reach the level of the socially appropriate
incentives to educate and inform consumers. Each single firm would not be able to
internalize all the gain from the increased consumers’ information, so her incentive to bring
it about will be insufficient compared to the social gains from the increase in consumers’
information. So the market 35will not by itself provide the optimal amount of education and
information to overcome those factors affecting consumers’ ignorance.
Consumer Law can to an extent provide partial remedy in some contexts, particularly
through disclosure requirements and the creation and imposition of a standardized system
                                                                                                                                              
alternatives are relevant to this sort of inquiry. A detailed analysis of these and other issues for advertising
regulation, in Richard Craswell, “Interpreting Deceptive Advertising”, 65 Boston University Law Review
(1985), p. 658; Richard Craswell, “Regulating Deceptive Advertising: The Role of Cost-benefit Analysis”,
64 Southern California Law Review (1991), p. 549.
31 Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985, on contracts negotiated away from business premises;
Directive 97/7/EC of 20 May 1997, on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts;
Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000, on electronic commerce.
32 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, “Cognition and contract”, in Peter Newman (editor), The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol. I, MacMillan, London, (1998), p. 282; Cass Sunstein (editor),
Behavioral Law and Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (2000).
33 Moreover, bounded rationality makes the appeal of deceptive and misleading advertising higher for
some producers: see Matthew Nagler, “Rather Bait than Switch: Deceptive Advertising with Bounded
Consumer Rationality”, 51 Journal of Public Economics (1993), p. 359. And surveys of advertisers show that
legal constraints are the most important factor influencing decision-making about advertising content and
policy: Joel Davis, “Ethics in Advertising Decisionmaking: Implications for Reducing the Incidence of
Deceptive Advertising”, 28 Journal of Consumer Affairs (1994), p. 380.
34 The most notable example of this problem in consumer contracts arises in the context of standard form
contracts: reading and understanding the standard terms is costly for the consumer –in time and effort-,
and given that the terms are not subject to negotiation, the consumer will usually opt for not even starting
to read the forms.
35 By the way, here again a monopoly market structure will arguably approximate better than a
competitive one the optimal provision of information, given that the monopolist can internalize more in
terms of profits the gains from increased information. The same applies to rational ignorance: competitive
firms are more likely to exploit consumers’ rational ignorance than monopolists, because competitive
pressures can unleash a “race to the bottom” for those variables that the typical consumer rationally
decides to ignore.
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of measuring and expressing one or more of the variables relevant to the transaction.
Probably the best example of this kind of legal intervention is the standardized annual
percentage rate that Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 on consumer credit
(modified by Directives 90/88 and 98/7) imposes as a disclosure requirement for consumer
credit contracts. Here, the most (but not the only) relevant element of the transaction needs
to be expressly and noticeably communicated in a homogenous and –at least relatively-
easily computable and user-friendly way for consumers, so these will be more aware of the
relevant variable and the possibility of shopping around for more attractive credit terms is
significantly enhanced36. Mandatory and standardized labeling and information disclosure
are also common concerning health and safety factors, and experimental and empirical
studies have shown them to have had a positive impact on welfare-enhancing consumer
choices in the relevant markets37. Additionally, cooling-off periods allowing the consumer
to cancel the transaction during a limited period after it was agreed38, can be understood as
a way of reducing the impact of bounded rationality and cognitive deficiencies in those
consumer transactions in which these problems might seem more serious39
                                                
36 Standardized disclosure obligations might pose some problems of its own, that might have an economic
impact: they can induce producers to concentrate quality efforts on the variables included in the standard,
at the expense of others left out of it, that may be also important to consumers, and the required disclosure
may displace other information that the producer would have conveyed, and might also have been
informative to consumers. See, Howard Beales, Richard Craswell, and Steven Salop, “The Efficient
Regulation of Consumer Information”, 24 Journal of Law and Economics (1981), p. 523 and following.
Regarding the specific standardized disclosure requirement in consumer credit contracts, some have
criticized this from an economic perspective, stressing the increase in compliance and litigation costs, the
negative effects on credit collection terms and customer service  (variables not included in the standard
disclosure), and the fact that only already well-informed and wealthy borrowers are likely to benefit from
it. See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 5th edition, Aspen Publishers, New York, (1998), p. 408;
Richard Hynes and Eric Posner, “The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance”, ”, 4 American Law and
Economics Review (2002), p. 194-195. Standardized information on contract terms, however, can also be
efficient on account of network externalities (the addition of new users increases the utility derived by
existing users).
37 Christine Moorman, “A Quasi Experiment to Assess the Consumer and Informational Determinants of
Nutrition Information Processing Activities: The Case of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act”, 15
Journal of Public Policy and Marketing (1996), p. 28; Alan Mathios, “The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure
Laws on Product Choices: An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market”, 43 Journal of Law and Economics
(2000), p. 660.
38 Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985, on contracts negotiated away from business premises;
Directive 94/47/EC of 26 October 1994, on time-sharing; Directive 97/7/EC of 20 May 1997, on the
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts.
39 Pamaria Rekaiti and Roger van den Bergh, “Cooling-Off Periods in the Consumer Laws of the EC
Member States: A Comparative Law and Economics Aproach”, 23 Journal of Consumer Policy (2000), p. 371,
at p. 374 and following, and 385 and following, argue that cooling-off periods, particularly those
introduced by EC consumer protection legislation, are potential remedies for irrational behavior,
situational monopoly and informational asymetries. Some, however, doubt the effective impact of those
measures, the reason lying in the prediction that few consumers would exercise a right of cancellation that
requires them to admit to themselves that they acted as suckers by signing the contract in the first place:
See Ian Ramsay, “Consumer protection”, in Peter Newman (editor), The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics and the Law, vol. I, MacMillan, London, (1998), p. 412. Others do not only consider them
irrelevant, but criticize them as raising ex post opportunism by consumers: Hans-Peter Schwintowski,
“Contractual Rules Concerning the Marketing of Goods and Services – Requirements of Form and Content
versus Private Autonomy”, in Stefan Grundmann, Wolfgang Kerber, and Stephen Weatherill (Eds.), Party
Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin-New York (2001),
p.331, at p. 346.
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This leads to another source of consumers’ lack of information, namely search costs. If
search costs are relatively high, consumers will not be informed and so the terms of the
transaction (including price, even when the market is competitive) might not be optimal40.
Disclosure requirements and standardized informative messages, such as the one referred
to in the previous paragraph, serve also to reduce search costs in various consumer
markets and, thus, to improve the functioning of these markets.
The preceding considerations should not induce us to think that the imperfect information
rationale sets an insurmountable boundary to the kind of rules that an economically
oriented consumer protection Law would be allowed to use. In particular, the tools of
consumer law can include not only information-enhancing measures, but also disclosure
and standardization requirements, and prevention of deception and fraud. Additionally,
the characteristics of some informational problems may (but only “may”) suggest that
mandatory regulation of some contractual terms is the best cure for such informational
market failures. We have mentioned the case of rational ignorance regarding standard form
contracts. Information disclosure and facilitating rules might be insufficient, given the very
nature of the lack of information (even a minuscule information cost would make
consumers rationally and intelligently decide not to read the fine print). And the race to the
bottom in the quality of contract terms that can ensue from this set of conditions might call
for legal regulation of a minimum level of quality or bundle of consumer rights. That is
precisely what Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts
does in Article 3 and the Annex. Of course, it is debatable whether the Directive has
achieved an optimal balance in the determination of the required quality of contract terms,
and even if any legislator or Court can aspire to it, but economic theory does not in itself
exclude the use of mandatory regulation in this type of setting.
Moreover, if the disclosure legally required would lead to complex revelation of
information by producers, and this complexity would significantly raise information-
processing costs for consumers, an outright ban on a certain product or service may (but
only “may”) be preferrable on efficiency grounds. This would be the case if the reduction in
informational costs outweighs the costs that both producers (loss of profit) and consumers
(loss of enhanced product choice or variety) incur as a consequence of the prohibition41.
Similarly, in circumstances in which the asymmetry in information does not affect the
consumer, but the seller, a case for mandatory intervention may (but only “may”) be made
on pure efficiency grounds. Here, it is the consumer who has some piece of private
                                                
40 For optimality in markets with positive search costs, however, it is not necessary that all buyers shop
around. When producers cannot distinguish consumers who have searched for contract terms from those
who haven’t, and when the proportion of searchers is large enough (but not 100%), the terms will be
optimal, because producers would prefer to sell to all consumers rather than only to non-searchers. See
Alan Schwartz and Louis Wilde, “Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal
and Economic Analysis”, 127 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1979), p. 630; Alan Schwartz and Louis
Wilde, “Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security
Interests”, 69 Virginia Law Review (1983), p. 1387.
41 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Robert Howse, and Michael J. Trebilcock, “Information-Based Principles for
Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy”, 21 Journal of Consumer Policy (1998), p. 159.
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information that the producer cannot observe. This is particularly likely in credit markets,
in which the professional creditor cannot usually observe the likelihood or the willingness
of the consumer to pay back the credit. Imperfect information may give rise here to the use
of harsh contract terms or securities that act as signal of belonging to the “good” credit-
worthy type of consumer, and not to the bad type. Even if some of these signals are too
crude and undesirable for the joint welfare of market participants, they may persist over
time. Legal rules setting limits to those terms (for instance, personal bankruptcy protection,
limits to repossession, assets excluded from forfeiture, and the like) may (but only “may”)
be efficient under some of these circumstances42.
All these matters, however, have been –wisely, in my view- left outside the scope of the
Directive on consumer credit (with the partial exception of limits to third-party rights and
assignment, which is theoretically akin to the other limits), and referred to the Laws of the
Member States. In fact, the set of substantive (that is, not pertaining to increased levels of
information) consumer rights under this Directive allows for extensive freedom of the
Member States to implement the quite general principles sketched to that effect, in contrast
with the detailed regulation of the disclosure rquirements that the same Directive contains.
6. The weighing of competitive gains in consumer protection Law
The arguments presented in the previous sections lead support to the substantial
independence of the economic function of consumer protection Law from that of
competition Law, and to the need to keep distinct the approach of each of these fields of the
Law. Despite this, there are cases in which the competitive consequences of consumer
protection issues are significant and should receive their due amount of attention. I will
now provide an example of what I mean by this joint balance of consumer protection and
competitive issues.
The area of advertising is particularly likely to give rise to issues of barriers to entry
established by dominant firms in order to deter entry by potential new entrant firms.
Heavy advertising expenditures, especially if associated with strong trademarks, serve as
goodwill and brand loyalty multipliers, and can constitute barriers that entrants will have
difficulty in overcoming. One way in which this may happen is through aggressive
advertising campaigns that make use of comparison with the established firm, or stress the
advantages of the entrants (in price or in other relevant dimension) over the incumbent. In
the enforcement of consumer protection rules in advertising one should take into account
that in order to surmount the advertising barriers erected by the incumbent firm, the
entrants might need some greater leeway as to the aggressiveness of comparative
advertising and to the level of substantiation of the claims contained in their advertisement.
In the end, entry by new firms would benefit consumers through increased output and
                                                                                                                                              
42 A full economic discussion of these measures can be found in Richard Hynes and Eric Posner, “The Law
and Economics of Consumer Finance” 4 American Law and Economics Review (2002), p. 168.
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reduced prices, so it is  efficient  that in the enforcement of consumer protection rules on
advertising, regulators and Courts take into account the future competitive gains of the
advertising campaign - especially when it is the incumbent who challenges it on charges of
being misleading.
Other examples are possible (for instance, some contract terms like exclusivity clauses and
contractual damage clauses might also eventually serve to raise barriers against potential
competitors43), but the point is clear. Competitive gains are real social gains, and they
should be weighted when one is designing, interpreting and implementing consumer
protection Law. But this should not mean that in this process we take a side road and
forget what I believe is the proper role and economic rationale for consumer Law, and
specially EC consumer protection Law, which is to address the problems of imperfect
information in consumer markets. The challenges that EC consumer protection legislation
faces in building a consistent framework that would serve to  increase efficiency in
consumer markets that are still largely (though certainly  not always to the same extent)
fragmented by national, cultural, and linguistic barriers, are, to be  sure, enormous. To
burden EC consumer policy with the extra task of increasing the amount of competition in
European consumer markets does not seem to me a sound policy prescription. It is a task
which this branch of EC Law (in fact, private and public Laws of the Member States also) is
ill-equiped to acomplish  successfully.
                                                                                                                                              
43 Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton, “Contracts as Barriers to Entry”, 77 American Economic Review
(1987), p. 388.
